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different analysis. In his discussion of the death penalty, being un-
able to demonstrate deterrence statistically, Tucker turns to the "re-
cent emergence of the 'serial murderer.'" "These are the 
murderers," he explains, "who were previously deterred by the 
death penalty." In this context, he prefers to have the blame fall 
elsewhere, and so delivers a blistering attack on those who assert 
family background plays a role in causing serial murders: "Once 
again the experts have tried to psychologize and sociologize the 
whole thing into oblivion. Searching for an explanation of the 'se-
rial murderers,' The New York Times quoted one expert as saying: 
'All of them had real difficulties with their mothers early on.' " 
When writing about black mothers, he must have forgotten his 
rapier-like response to the "experts" at The New York Times: 
Has there ever been a time when a certain portion of the population didn't have 
difficulties with their mothers early on? And even if motherhood were the problem, 
how is it that this whole new breed of killers, ranging in age from their early twen-
ties to their late fifties, should suddenly start expressing their hostilities right about 
1972? 
The causes of crime and the role of the criminal justice system 
in our society are both overripe for review. The appropriate 
method for vindication of the guarantees in the Bill of Rights is still 
in doubt. The probable gulf between the public perception and the 
reality of the criminal justice system needs consideration and atten-
tion. Vigilante, unfortunately offers nothing of value for any of the 
above. 
JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HIS· 
TORY OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME 
COURT. Henry Abraham.1 New York: Oxford University 
Press. 2d ed. 1985. Pp. xi, 430. Cloth, $24.95; paper, $9.95. 
Kermit L. Hal/2 
"In every case," writes Gerald Nachman of the San Francisco 
Examiner & Chronicle, "Judge Wapner rules quickly, firmly, and 
fairly. Nothing escapes his flinty gaze. I can't imagine how he's 
been overlooked for appointment to the Supreme Court, for clearly 
here is a man you would trust to rule wisely on abortion and class-
room prayer."3 Familiar, benign, sensible, Joseph A. Wapner, the 
l. James Hart Professor of Government, University of Virginia. 
2. Professor of History and Law, University of Florida. 
3. San Francisco Exam. & Chron., June 16, 1985, Sunday Datebook, at 17. 
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judge of the syndicated television program, "The People's Court," 
projects an image of moral force and pragmatic reckoning-of what 
it means to be a judge-to more than twenty-five million Americans 
each week. Members of the high Court in Washington have re-
ceived him; Time has even reported that on some afternoons Justice 
Thurgood Marshall "can be found in his chambers chuckling" as he 
watches "The People's Court."4 An Arizona woman has written to 
President Ronald Reagan from her mobile-home park, urging him 
to elevate Wapner to coequal status with Justice MarshalLs 
The notion of appointing Wapner to the Supreme Court, as the 
second edition of Henry Abraham's Justice and Presidents makes 
clear, is not altogether fantastic. He has the appropriate creden-
tials. Of the 106 persons appointed to the Court since 1789 (102 
actually served), only about one-fifth have had as much judicial ex-
perience as Wapner, a California municipal and then superior court 
judge for twenty-one years before moving to the world of entertain-
ment. Further, with both an undergraduate and a law degree, he is 
better educated than most Justices. The mainstay of "The People's 
Court" has the temperament as well. The president of the Philadel-
phia Municipal Court has declared as much by formal resolution. 
He "fulfills Socrates' classic qualities of a judge: 'To hear courte-
ously, to answer wisely, to consider soberly, and to decide 
impartially.' "6 
Could Judge Wapner be appointed to the Supreme Court? 
Probably not, at least by the present administration, since he's 
a Democrat. "There are just as many qualified Republicans," 
Abraham observes, "as there are Republicans." Experienced judges 
of the proper political persuasion are always available to fill the ran-
dom vacancies that occur on the nine-person Court. Even with the 
proper partisan identification, the odds against Wapner reaching the 
bench are long indeed. Those persons who have succeeded have 
combined political (although not necessarily partisan) connections, 
professional merit, personal friendships, geographic and (some-
times) religious representativeness, ideological compatibility with 
an appointing President, and luck. 
Justices and Presidents examines how Presidents have applied 
these different qualifications. It is, in Henry Abraham's introduc-
tory words, "an attempt to analyze and evaluate the motivations 
that underlie the process of Presidential selection and appointment, 
the degree and kind of fulfillment of Presidential hopes or expecta-
4. TIME, Oct. 8, 1984, at 31. 
5. Kahn, Profiles (Judge Joseph A. Wapner), NEw YoRKER, Mar. 31, 1986, at 46. 
6. !d. at 58. 
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tions, and the professional performance of those entrusted with the 
responsibilities of the business of judging." The book is nothing less 
than a history of every appointment made to the Court from 1789 
through that of Sandra Day O'Connor in 1981. Abraham begins by 
explaining the criteria used to evaluate the Justices, the mechanics 
of the process, and its impact as registered in the collective back-
grounds of the Justices. Thereafter, he marches in chronological 
order through the appointment practices of each administration. 
Presidents, Abraham shows, have dominated the undemo-
cratic, subterranean, and open-ended selection process. Beyond the 
bare constitutional provision requiring the advice and consent of the 
Senate, chief executives have had a free hand in weighing the impor-
tance of age, nationality, education, prior judicial service, ideologi-
cal commitment, and other attributes. Unlike lower federal judicial 
appointments, Supreme Court appointments engage a President's 
personal attention. Each of them, according to Abraham, has made 
"a reasonable effort to know who he is about to send to the Supreme 
Court, why he is doing so, and what he expects of his choice's per-
formance once on the highest court." 
The Constitution purposefully insures the appointees' indepen-
dence once on the bench. This independence has permitted them to 
construct a virtual monopoly over constitutional interpretation, 1 a 
monopoly that has given the Justices significant influence over pub-
lic affairs. "The Supreme Court of the United States," Abraham 
writes, "is, indeed, engaged in the political process." The Court, he 
argues, has been as much a forum for the resolution of constitu-
tional politics as a temple of revealed constitutional truths. 
The growth in the Court's political role has not been accompa-
nied by any increase in judicial accountability. The framers origi-
nally intended the Court to operate on a narrow legal plane, with 
the great political questions left to the other branches. The Justices 
were to administer law; they were to have, in the words of 
Alexander Hamilton, neither "force nor will." The Court's political 
role nonetheless mushroomed, but the mechanisms of accountabil-
ity did not keep pace. Proposals to elect Supreme Court Justices 
have appeared from time to time, but they have never received seri-
ous consideration.s 
7. K. HALL, THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 
37-49 (1985). 
8. Hall, Why We Don't Elect Federal Judges, 10 THIS CONST. 20 (1986). The Court 
does operate in a setting that forces responsibility on it. "Judges are bound within walls, 
lines, and limits," Abraham notes, "that are often unseen by the laymen." They are limited 
by precedent and the ideal of judicial restraint-in brief, by the tradition of the rule of law. 
The Justices cannot act without a case and controversy, and once they do act they rely upon 
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The imbalance between independence and accountability has 
contributed to the brittle nature of our contemporary constitutional 
politics. While most Justices could stroll through main street 
America unnoticed, their constitutionally mandated distance from 
the public, coupled with their power, generates public frustration, 
even outrage.9 It is these issues that make the new edition of Jus-
tices and Presidents timely reading. Abraham, a political scientist at 
the University of Virginia, argues that historically the selection pro-
cess has offered the most important means of exercising prospective 
accountability over the Justices. 
President Ronald Reagan certainly agrees. His Department of 
Justice has imposed tough ideological standards on would-be fed-
eral judges. Attorney General Edwin Meese summed up the admin-
istration's position in his July 1985 address before the American 
Bar Association Convention. He blasted the Court's liberal "ac-
tivist" record and called for the appointment of Justices who would 
root their decisionmaking in the "Constitution's literal text and in 
history" rather than trying to become "political power-brokers" 
who transform the "courtroom into mini-legislatures in an attempt 
to make an end run around popular government." 10 
Abraham traces the genealogy of the Reagan administration's 
concerns to Nixon's abortive attempts to engineer a conservative 
majority to reverse the Warren Court's liberalism. Nixon vowed to 
the public that he would "strengthen the peace forces as against the 
criminal forces of the land." He promised to appoint federal judges 
who saw themselves as "caretakers" of the Constitution and not, to 
quote Nixon once again, as "super-legislator[s] with a free hand 
to impose . . . social and political viewpoints upon the American 
people." Nixon vowed to appoint only "strict constructionists" to 
the federal bench. 
Nixon blundered badly in handling the first vacancy on the 
Court. According to Abraham, his selection policies embraced a 
"relentless pursuit of mediocrity" that threatened to undermine the 
Court's credibility. Nixon's decision to replace the disgraced Abe 
Fortas with first Clement F. Haynsworth and then G. Harold 
Carswell set the tone. (Judge Wapner, by the way, has credentials 
every bit as good.) It was Carswell of whom Senator Roman 
Hruska said, "Even if he were mediocre, there are a lot of mediocre 
judges and people and lawyers. They are entitled to a little repre-
the other branches to enforce their decisions. The Supreme Court is not a constitutional free· 
for·all. 
9. The predicament of Justice Harry Blackmun reveals as much. The author of Roe v. 
Wade takes his meals in the Supreme Court's public cafeteria accompanied by a bodyguard. 
10. N.Y. Times, July 18, 1985, at 7, col. I. 
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sentation aren't they, and a little chance? We can't have all 
Brandeises and Frankfurters and Cardozos and stuff like that 
there." 11 So far, however, the big prize-the Supreme Court-has 
largely eluded President Reagan. He has made only one appoint-
ment, that of Sandra Day O'Connor to replace the retiring Potter 
Stewart. But new opportunities may come shortly; the Court is 
long in the tooth.12 There is an air of anticipation about the future 
direction of the high court not present since the waning days of the 
"Nine Old Men" of the late 1930's. Indeed, Professor Tribe has 
warned that Reagan may well have an opportunity to "pack the 
Court" with ideological favorites such as those he has already 
placed on the lower federal courts.I3 
Abraham suggests that there would be nothing unusual should 
Reagan do so. These are interesting but not unique times in the 
political history of federal judicial selections. "All Presidents have 
tried to pack the Court," Abraham writes, "to mold it in their 
images. . . . There is, of course, nothing wrong in a President's 
attempt to staff the Court with jurists who read the Constitution his 
way." 
Abraham does find troubling, however, the present genera-
tion's invocation of labels such as "strict constructionist" and "lib-
eral," when the issue should be whether the "nominees are 
professionally, intellectually, and morally qualified to serve." These 
labels mean little, both before and after appointment. As Justice 
Frankfurter once responded when questioned about whether an ap-
pointee changes once on the Court: "If he is any good, he does." 
Furthermore, given the value-laden quality of our constitutional 
lawmaking, categorizing a particular ruling by the Court is likely to 
be highly subjective. A "good" decision is one that pleases us; a 
"poor" decision is "one that does not." Abraham, although his 
political sensibilities favor protection of minority interests, accepts 
that "the Constitution ... was simply not designed to provide judi-
cial remedies for every social or political ill." Since the Justices 
cannot be everything to all persons, he argues, then the measure of 
success in the appointment process is whether it provides Justices of 
sufficient talent and discretion to accomplish those things appropri-
ate to the proper sphere of authority granted to them. 
Abraham leaves no doubt that he believes the process has done 
II. Quoted in R. HARRIS, DECISION 110 (1971). 
12. When this review went to press, President Reagan's nominations of Justice William 
Rehnquist to replace retiring Chief Justice Warren Burger and of Judge Antonin Scalia for 
the office of Associate Justice had just been confirmed by the Senate. -Eos. 
13. McHugh, Senate is Key to Blocking Court-Packing Attempt (Laurence Tribe), Chi. 
Daily L. Bull., Nov. 25, 1985, at I, col. 2. 
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precisely that. "In general, if not unfailingly, the Supreme Court 
... has evinced a remarkable degree of common constitutional sense 
in its striving to maintain the blend of continuity and change that 
constitute the sine qua non for desirable stability in the basic gov-
ernmental processes of a democracy." 
Like the first, the second edition of Justices and Presidents is a 
mixed success, largely because Abraham's command of the primary 
sources and his research design do not match the scope of his ambi-
tions. Make no mistake, however; this is a fine book in many ways. 
Abraham provides in one volume an unvarnished historical discus-
sion of the selection of Supreme Court Justices. Reviewers of the 
first edition, although skeptical of the book's heavily anecdotal 
quality, praised Abraham for bringing so much detail to bear so 
lucidly on such a long-neglected topic.t4 The second edition de-
serves similar praise. It is even more comprehensive, with a new 
chapter added on appointments to the Burger Court, a significant 
revision of the chapters treating developments from Franklin 
Roosevelt to Lyndon Johnson, and only a slightly less thorough re-
vision of the chapter covering appointments from Theodore 
Roosevelt through Herbert Hoover. Abraham, as these revisions 
indicate, is clearly most at home in the twentieth century. He cov-
ers the years from 1789 to 1901, when fifty-eight Justices were ap-
pointed, in eighty-two pages; he takes more than twice that number 
for the twentieth century, when forty-eight were appointed. 
Abraham has also attempted to respond to earlier criticism that he 
relied on inappropriate and subjective guides in rating the Justicests 
by adding a new introductory chapter that explains his standards. 
There is no doubt that anyone interested in learning about the selec-
tion of Supreme Court Justices can turn with great profit to Justices 
and Presidents. 
Even after these substantial revisions, problems still plague the 
second edition, and their presence suggests the inherent weakness of 
Abraham's approach. Reviewers of the first edition registered three 
complaints against Justices and Presidents. First, that for a schol-
arly work, Abraham had failed to document his work with sufficient 
care. Second, and related to the first, that he had not extended his 
research net broadly enough. And third, that he applied inappro-
14. For a sampling of the major reviews see Book Review, I I CHOICE 1210 (1974); 
Duram, Book Review, 61 J. AM. HtsT. 1093 (1975); EcoNOMIST, July 20, 1974, at 104; 
Kahn, Book Review, 63 CALL. REV. 827 (1975); Miller, Book Review, 24 AM. U. L. REV. 
527 (1975); Pape, Book Review, NEw REPUBLIC, Aug. 10, 1974, at 21; Schmidhauser, Book 
Review, 89 PoL. Sci. Q. 859 (1974); Volkomer, Book Review, 21 N.Y.L.F. 696 (1976). 
15. See, e.g., Kahn, supra note 14. 
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priate measures to evaluate the quality of JustiCM and Presidents. 
The same shortcomings persist in the new edition. 
Abraham often leaves his reader guessing about where the evi-
dence to back an argument comes from. Any author attempting to 
synthesize large amounts of material over broad periods of time 
confronts an unenviable task. The principals in the judicial selec-
tion process, even of Supreme Court Justices, often have differing 
views of how that process has operated for the simple reason that 
they sometimes supported different candidates. Furthermore, they 
often leave only fragmentary records, a problem compounded in 
dealing with nineteenth-century appointments. 
Abraham is sensitive to these matters, and he has responded to 
earlier complaints about inadequate documentation. The new edi-
tion sports a bibliography arranged, in part, by name of Supreme 
Court Justice. The materials applicable to a Justice's appointment 
now appear under his or her name. 
Still, scholars will have difficulty reconstructing from 
Abraham's notes and bibliography the precise authority he invokes. 
Take, for example, the criteria that George Washington used. 
Abraham claims that "probably more than any other President," 
Washington "not only had a clear set of criteria for Court candi-
dacy, but adhered to them predictably and religiously." But how 
does Abraham know what these were? The reader will search the 
notes in vain for an answer. There is, of course, a huge secondary 
literature on Washington's patronage practices, and it does reveal 
the concern with quality, morality, patriotism, and geographic bal-
ance that Abraham attributes to Washington.I6 A close reading of 
these secondary sources makes clear that Washington never specifi-
cally articulated these criteria for the federal bench; rather, 
Abraham and others have arrived at them by inference. 
But does the skimping on citations make any difference? The 
answer is that it surely does. When measured by the evidence that 
Abraham does present, he may not have, especially for the eight-
eenth and nineteenth centuries, full command of the events sur-
rounding particular appointments. It is, of course, impossible to 
rewrite Abraham's book, but a single example will illustrate the 
problem. 
Washington, in 1789, appointed John Rutledge, of South Caro-
lina, Associate Justice of the Court. Washington had great faith in 
Rutledge, regarding his contribution at Philadelphia as seminal. 
Abraham correctly indicates that Washington's opinion of the 
16. For a discussion of this literature, see Perry, Supreme Court Appointments. 1789-
1801: Criteria, Presidential Style, and the Press of Event, J. EARLY REPUBLIC (forthcoming). 
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South Carolinian was so high that he contemplated appointing him 
Chief Justice, a position that ultimately went to John Jay. 
Rutledge, however, never heard a case, stepping down in 1791 to 
become chief justice of South Carolina. 
The Rutledge story did not end there. When Chief Justice Jay 
resigned in 1795 to become governor of New York, President 
Washington turned again to Rutledge, who (Abraham correctly 
surmises) had wanted the top post all along. The Senate, however, 
rejected the nomination, making Rutledge the only recess appointee 
in the Supreme Court's history not to receive subsequent Senate 
confirmation. 
The question is, why? Abraham concludes that it was because 
of Rutledge's "pronounced opposition to the Jay Treaty." Rutledge 
was unhappy with the Jay Treaty, and Federalists were equally in-
censed over a vituperative harangue he gave in Charleston denounc-
ing it. So far, so good. Although Abraham does not document 
these developments in the notes, the secondary sources listed in the 
bibliography sustain his conclusion. But Abraham did not search 
widely enough in the available primary sources to realize that far 
more was involved in the abortive Rutledge nomination. 
Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton on December 
14, 1795 wrote to New York Senator Rufus King with advice about 
how to proceed with the Rutledge nomination. "If there was noth-
ing in the case but his imprudent sally upon a certain occasion [the 
Charleston speech]," Hamilton wrote, 
I should think the reasons for letting him pass would outweigh those for opposing 
his passage. But if it be really true, that he is sottish or that his mind is otherwise 
deranged, or that he exposed himself by improper conduct in pecuniary transac-
tions, the byass [sic] of my judgment would be too negative.l7 
Hamilton's letter raised concerns far different from those that 
Abraham attributes to the defeat of Rutledge. The Senate rejected 
the South Carolinian less because he was a political liability than 
because he was mentally unstable. Rutledge had three years earlier 
suffered the loss of his wife, and he reacted in bizarre ways--exces-
sive drinking, gambling, and public tirades. So serious were 
Rutledge's problems that on December 26, well before he learned of 
the Senate's action (remember, this was the eighteenth century), he 
tried to kill himself. Two days later he wrote to the President re-
signing his position because of "ill Health." 1s The reader would 
17. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Rufus King (Dec. 14, 1795) (Rufus King Pa-
pers, New York Historical Society). 
18. Letter from John Rutledge to George Washington (Dec. 28, 1795) (Record Group 
59, National Archives). 
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never learn of these events from Abraham's clipped di&cussion of 
the Rutledge rejection. 
Are the explanations of other appointments similatly flawed? 
Perhaps, particularly for the nineteenth century. The reason is that 
Abraham has simply relied too fully on the secondary literature. In 
a paragraph introducing the bibliography, he observes that 
The sources ... for a book of this type are numerous, eclectic, and sometimes 
elusive. Primary information, which consists largely of personal and official papers 
of the principals, can be especially elusive. A good many of those documents are 
not readily available because some Justices have provided for the deliberate destruc-
tion or partial sealing off from publication of sundry notes and papers. (Emphasis 
in original.) 
Fair enough, as far as it goes. 
Abraham gives no sign of having examined any major eight-
eenth- and nineteenth-century manuscript and archival collections. 
Would it not make sense, given the topic, to have at least combed 
the papers of such "principals" as Washington, John Marshall, 
James K. Polk, Abraham Lincoln, Ulysses S. Grant, and William 
McKinley? If Abraham searched even the most basic of primary 
sources (not to mention the papers of senators and other political 
notables), his bibliography and notes give no hint of it. 
The book's superficiality appears in another way. Abraham at-
tempts in this new edition to combat the charge that he previously 
relied on inappropriate sources to weigh the significance of each 
Justice. He does so through an introductory chapter that clarifies 
the assumptions that underlie the ranking of the Justices. Yet, since 
the research design remains the same, the clarification only makes 
the weaknesses of the model more apparent. 
He proposes to assess the quality of the Justices by invoking 
academic surveys of their abilities. The most important of these 
was the poll conducted by Albert P. Blaustein and Roy M. Mersky 
in 1970. They asked sixty-five "qualified observers," composed of 
law deans and professors of law, history, and political science, to 
place each Justice in one of five categories: "great," "near great," 
"average," "below average," and "failure."J9 No other criteria, 
yardsticks, or measuring rods were provided. Abraham in the sec-
ond edition has added to the findings of Blaustein and Mersky re-
sults from other polls commissioned between 1978 and 1983, 
although his appendices list only the results of the 1970 poll. Mem-
bers of the Court sitting since that date are not included. In the 
text, however, Abraham does produce an "all star" list of nine 
19. A. BLAUSTEIN & R. MERSKY, THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED JUSTICES: STATISTICAL 
STUDIES ON THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (1978). 
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"great" Justices-Marshall, Story, Taney, Holmes, Hughes, 
Brandeis, Cardozo, Black, and Warren.2o 
Reviewers of the first edition greeted this categorization with 
skepticism. One critic complained that "[t]he book would have 
been far better had the enterprise of making impressionistic evalua-
tions of Justices and Presidents been abandoned completely."21 
Abraham's technique has the heuristic value of providing a conve-
nient pigeonhole for each Justice. That these categories have any-
thing to do with the quality of the selection process is another 
matter. Still, if reputation among "qualified observers" of the Court 
is any measure, some Justices-and some Presidents-have per-
formed better than others. One would be hard pressed to argue that 
Justice James Byrnes (who was ranked a "failure") was a greater 
figure in the Court's history than John Marshall. But it is meaning-
less to rank Byrnes with Justice Willis Van Devanter (also ranked a 
"failure"), who served on the bench for over 30 years. Justice 
Byrnes spent little over a year on the bench during World War 11-
hardly time to succeed, let alone fail. 
Abraham acknowledges the difficulties but he does not solve 
them. He argues that, while " 'greatness' is not quantifiable, yet the 
evidence is persuasive that the term or concept is not only a mean-
ingful one in the eyes of qualified observers of the judicial function 
at its apex, but that there is something closely akin to consensus 
among them." Even granting the existence of a consensus (which 
seems debatable since one-quarter of the original Blaustein and 
Mersky "all stars" sank into the ranks of the "near great" in the 
1978 to 1983 surveys), problems remain. 
The research design yields little analytical payoff. One would 
expect that the purpose of such a qualitative scaling, in a book de-
voted to judicial selection, would be to determine which Presidents 
have been most successful in terms of the quality of the appointees. 
Have great Presidents appointed great Justices? Abraham does not 
answer this question, and the data suggest the absence of any rela-
tionship. James Madison, only an "average" President, appointed 
Joseph Story, one of the consensual "great" Justices; Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, a "great" President, selected James F. Byrnes, a consen-
sual "failure." 
It is amazing that in a discipline such as political science, 
where there is a long history of seeking definitional exactness, terms 
20. The Blaustein and Mersky list was composed of twelve Justices. The three Justices 
dropped in subsequent polls were: Felix Frankfurter, Harlan Fiske Stone, and John Marshall 
Harlan I. The appendix lists only the results of the Blaustein and Mersky poll of 1970. 
21. Kahn, supra note 14. 
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such as "great" and "failure" are so carelessly tossed al:k>ut. That 
Abraham in the early chapters qualifies them more than he did in 
the first edition does little to rectify the damage done in undermin-
ing the historical richness of the selection process and the life of the 
Court itself.22 
This judgment, however, may be too harsh. It assumes that 
Justices and Presidents intended to build theory, that it aimed to be 
scholarly, and that it sought to explain in comprehensive terms the 
interaction of politics, the legal culture, and constitutional develop-
ment. Despite the scholarly trappings this is essentially a popular 
book, a kind of pseudo-social scientific history of appointments to 
the Supreme Court done up for students and the public. 
Justices and Presidents popularizes a stereotypical view of the 
judicial process similar to that cultivated by the image of Judge 
Wapner and "The People's Court." It is sprightly, anecdotal, and 
superficial. Abraham renders the complex simple by dividing the 
world of judicial selection into good and bad Justices, skilled and 
failed Presidents. As with Judge Wapner, what you get is what you 
see. Only an effort that plumbs the existing primary materials fully 
and that develops a more theoretically sound research design is 
likely to reveal fully the process by which Justices have been placed 
on the world's most powerful Court. Even if Abraham successfully 
mastered the sources and eliminated the stereotypes, he would still 
be left to explain that most elusive of relationships-what the 
method of judicial accountability marked out by the selection pro-
cess has to do with the exercise of independent behavior by the Jus-
tices once they reach the bench. As Alexander Bickel once 
observed, and as Abraham understands, in the appointment pro-
cess, "you shoot an arrow into a far-distant future when you ap-
point a Justice ... and not the man himself can tell you what he will 
think about some of the problems that he will face."23 Ultimately, 
Abraham is trying to connect the unconnectable. 
22. The Abraham evaluation scheme also places too much faith in experts. The opera-
tive words in Abraham's introductory chapter are "qualified observers." No doubt the law 
deans and other respondents were well informed about the Court and the Justices, but 
whether they were equally well-informed about all phases of the Justices' careers is Jess clear. 
For example, in the Mersky and Blaustein poll, every Justice designated a "failure" served in 
the twentieth century and all of them occupied a place on the bench within the living memory 
of the respondents. Were there no "failures" on the Court before the "Four Horsemen" of 
the 1930's? 
The poll raises still other questions. The largest body of Justices are ranked "average." 
What does that mean? Are they "average" in relationship to fulfilling the criteria that 
Abraham has developed for the selection process? Or, are they "average" in the sense that 
they were less able than the "great" but more able than the "failures"? 
23. Quoted in TIME, May 23, 1969, at 24. 
